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THE BATTLE OF THE RIVER PLATE 

A MODEL HISTORY

  
 

    
  Based on an article printed in the Buenos Aires Herald in December 2009 commemorating the 70th anniversary of the first victory over a German capital ship by the Royal Navy during World War II and partly illustrated by aircraft from the Jet Age Reserve Model Collection.

Like many other such confrontations explored in my article on The Battle of the Atlantic, the pocket battleship Graf Spee ( pictured below) was partly defeated by Royal Naval air power and its own lack of air cover, although the belief of German intelligence in spoof British radio traffic also played an important part.

  
 

    
  The German pocket battleship Admiral Graf Spee - deliberately built to displace less than 10 000 tons in accordance with limitations on Kriegsmarine assets imposed by the 1919 Treaty of Versailles - mounted six 11" guns and - along with her two sister ships Deutschland and Admiral Scheer - was of a novel design, said to be faster than any ship that could outgun it and outgun any ship that could outsail it.
 		 
 

    
The German pocket battleship Admiral Graf Spee - deliberately built to displace less than 10 000 tons in accordance with limitations on Kriegsmarine assets imposed by the 1919 Treaty of Versailles - mounted six 11" guns and - along with her two sister ships Deutschland and Admiral Scheer - was of a novel design, said to be faster than any ship that could outgun it and outgun any ship that could outsail it.

Innovative weight saving construction methods - such as electric arc welding rather than rivetting the hull plates together - allowed such heavy armament while eight 9-cylinder double-acting two-stroke MAN diesels delivering 52 050 bhp to two propellers offered speed superior to that generated by equivalent steam turbines and power more instantly available.

However, raw low-grade bunker fuel needed treatment before being used in her diesel engines. A separating system routinely pre-cleaned the fuel and deposited it in six ready tanks situated close to the engines. The separators used high pressure steam produced in a boiler room lying between decks, aft of the funnel and above the armoured deck.  Feed water for this boiler was produced from an onboard desalination unit.

Similarly the Admiral Graf Spee was one of the first German warships to be fitted with 50 cm wavelength (600 MHz) Seetak radar mounted on a distinctive tall superstructure.

Launched in 1934 and commissioned in 1936 the pocket battleship was the second vessel to be named after World War One Admiral Graf Maximilian von Spee who died, along with two of his sons, in the first Battle of the Falkland Islands on 8 December 1914. The Admiral Graf Spee was Kriegsmarine flagship until 1938, performed international maritime control duties off the coast of Spain during the Spanish Civil War and in 1937 took part in the Royal Navy's Spithead Review along with HMS Hood and HMS Resolution.

Hans Langsdorff, a longstanding naval officer who had seen action at the World War One Battle of Jutland, assumed command on 1 November 1938 and set sail from Wilhelmshaven on 21 August 1939 ready to begin raiding commerce in the Indian and South Atlantic Oceans at the start of hostilities with Britain.

Supported by the supply ship, the tanker Altmark, Captain Langsdorff's orders were to sink British merchant ships, but to avoid combat with superior enemy forces, thus threatening vital Allied supply lines and drawing British naval units off their stations in other parts of the world.

The signal came on 26 September 1939 to "commence active participation in the trade war" 

While deployed as a commerce raider, Graf Spee was often disguised by the ship's carpenters with a fake "B" turret superposed over the forward "A" main turret, a false funnel aft of the float plane catapult and by painting the pyramidal superstructure to appear to be a tripod mast. False bow waves were painted on the hull to lead spotters to misjudge her speed.

However, due to Captain Langsdorff's strictl adherence to the contemporary rules of mercantile warfare by taking all crews on board before sinking each one of 9 merchantman, no lives had been lost in these operations.

Nevertheless, Langsdorff's humane approach to his work meant that before the 10,086-ton Blue Star liner Doric Star was sunk on 2 December her crew had time to radio a distress message and sabotaged its engines so it could not be taken as a prize.   A day later the 7,983-ton steamer Tairoa also managed to send a distress call, alerting the Royal Navy to the Graf Spee's presence.


The Royal Navy assembled nine forces to search for the surface raider. Force G, the South American Cruiser Squadron, comprised the heavy cruiser HMS Exeter (Displacing 8,400 tons and mounting six 8-inch gun and a Supermarine Walrus flying boat, similar to the one pictured above) and two Leander-class light cruisers (Both displacing 7,000 tons and mounting eight 6-inch guns and a Fairey Seafox seaplane, similar to the one pictured below) — HMS Ajax and HMNZS Achilles.


The Royal Navy assembled nine forces to search for the surface raider. Force G, the South American Cruiser Squadron, comprised the heavy cruiser HMS Exeter (Displacing 8,400 tons and  mounting six 8-inch gun and a Supermarine Walrus flying boat, similar to the one pictured above) and two Leander-class light cruisers (Both displacing 7,000 tons and mounting eight 6-inch guns and a Fairey Seafox seaplane, similar to the one pictured below) — HMS Ajax and HMNZS Achilles.

The force was commanded by Commodore Henry Harwood from the Ajax, which was captained by Charles Woodhouse. The Achilles - part of the New Zealand Division (precursor to the Royal New Zealand Navy) was captained by Edward Parry and HMS Exeter was captained by F. S. Bell.

A County-class heavy cruiser,  HMS Cumberland ( Displacing 10,000 tons, with eight 8-inch guns and a Supermarine Walrus flying boat, seen above ), was refitting in the Falkland Islands at the time but available at short notice.

Commodore Harwood hoped to give his lighter warships a chance of overcoming the German advantage of greater range and heavier broadside by dividing the enemy’s fire. By day the ships of Force G would attack as two units, the Exeter separate from the Ajax and the Achilles. By night the ships would remain in company in open order

The three Royal Navy cruisers rendezvoused off the estuary of the River Plate - separating Argentina and Uruguay -  on 12 December 1939.  

On December 13, the opposing ships sighted each other and closed in for battle.

Langsdorff, despite having correctly identified Exeter, initially suspected that the two light cruisers were smaller destroyers and that the British ships were protecting a merchant convoy, the destruction of which would be a major prize.


Meanwhile Ajax and Achilles had closed to 13,000 yards, causing Admiral Graf Spee to split its main armament at 06:30, and otherwise using its 5.9-inch guns against them. At 06:32 Exeter fired two torpedoes from its starboard tubes but both missed. At 06:37 Ajax launched its Fairey Seafox seaplane by catapult.


Since Admiral Graf Spee’s Arado 196 reconnaissance seaplanes ( similar to the one pictured below ) were out of service, Langsdorff relied on lookouts for this information. He decided to engage despite having received a broadly accurate report from the German naval staff on  4 December outlining British activity in the River Plate area. This report included information that Ajax, Achilles, Exeter and Cumberland were patrolling the South American coast. Langsdorff realized too late that he was facing three cruisers.

Calling upon the immediate acceleration of Admiral Graf Spee’s diesel engines, he closed with the enemy squadron at 24 knots in the hope of engaging the steam-driven British ships before they could work up from cruising speed to full power. This strategy was an inexplicable blunder. Langsdorff could have manoeuvred to keep the Royal Navy ships at a range where he could destroy them with his 11 inch shells while remaining out of the effective range of their smaller 6-inch and 8-inch guns.

Exeter turned to the north-west while Ajax and Achilles, operating together, turned to the north-east to separate the Graf Spee’s fire. Admiral Graf Spee opened fire on Exeter at 19,000 yards with its six 11-inch guns at 06:18. Exeter opened fire at 06:20, Achilles at 06:21, Exeter’s aft guns at 06:22 and Ajax  at 06:23. From its opening salvo, Admiral Graf Spee’s gunfire proved fairly accurate, its third salvo straddling Exeter

At 06:23 an 11-inch shell burst just short of Exeter, abreast the middle of the ship. Splinters from this shell killed the torpedo tubes’ crews, damaged the ship’s communications, riddled the ship’s funnels and searchlights and wrecked the ship’s Walrus aircraft just as it was about to be launched for gunnery spotting.

Three minutes later Exeter suffered a direct hit. This shell struck its B-turret ( second from the bows ), putting its two guns out of action. Shrapnel swept the bridge, killing or wounding all bridge personnel except the captain and two others.  Captain Bell’s communications were wrecked. Communications from the aft conning position were also destroyed, and the ship had to be steered via a chain of messengers for the rest of the battle.

Meanwhile Ajax and Achilles had closed to 13,000 yards, causing Admiral Graf Spee to split its main armament at 06:30, and otherwise using its 5.9-inch guns against them. At 06:32 Exeter fired two torpedoes from its starboard tubes but both missed. At 06:37 Ajax launched its Fairey Seafox seaplane by catapult.

 At 06:38 Exeter turned so that it could fire its port torpedoes, and received two more direct hits from 11-inch shells. One hit A-turret and put it out of action, the other entered the hull and started fires. At this point Exeter was severely damaged, having only Y-turret in action, a seven degree list, was being flooded and being steered with the use of its small boat’s compass.

In return however, one of Exeter’s 8-inch shells penetrated two decks then exploded in Graf Spee’s funnel area — crucially destroying its desalination and raw fuel processing system  and leaving it with just 16 hours fuel, insufficient to allow a return to Germany.

Thus, from 06:38 Graf Spee was doomed; it could not effect complex fuel system repairs  under fire and there were no neutral or friendly naval bases 16 hours or less sailing time from its position.


After further engagements, the Graf Spee entered Montevideo in neutral Uruguay, dropping anchor at about 00:10 on 14 December. This was a political error, since Uruguay, while neutral, had benefited from significant British influence during its development and favoured the Allies. The port of Mar del Plata, on the Argentine coast, would have been a better choice for the Graf Spee to have found haven in.


After further engagements, the Graf Spee entered Montevideo in neutral Uruguay, dropping anchor at about 00:10 on 14 December. This was a political error, since Uruguay, while neutral, had benefited from significant British influence during its development and favoured the Allies. The port of Mar del Plata, on the Argentine coast, would have been a better choice for the Graf Spee to have found haven in.

In Montevideo, the 13th Hague Convention - agreed in 1907 - was invoked by the government of Uruguay. Under Article 2 of this international agreement:

 “...belligerent war-ships are not permitted to remain in the ports, roadsteads, or territorial waters of the said Power for more than twenty-four hours...”,

This had been modified by Article 14 which stated:

“A belligerent war-ship may not prolong its stay in a neutral port beyond the permissible time except on account of damage...”

 also relevant was Article 16, of which part reads:

“A belligerent war-ship may not leave a neutral port or roadstead until twenty-four hours after the departure of a merchant ship flying the flag of its adversary.”

In Montevideo, the Germans released 61 captive British merchant seamen who had been on board the Graf Spee.  All of those released spoke highly of their treatment and of Langsdorff, who spoke perfect English and lent them English books to pass the time. Captain Dove of the Africa Shell had even become friends with Langsdorff.

Captain Langsdorff then asked the Uruguayan government for two weeks to make repairs.

Initially, the British diplomats in Uruguay, principally Eugen Millington-Drake, tried to have Admiral Graf Spee forced to leave port immediately. However, after consultation with London, which was aware that there were no significant British naval forces in the area, Millington-Drake continued to openly demand that the Graf Spee leave.

At the same time though, the British secretly arranged for British and French merchant ships to steam from Montevideo at intervals of 24 hours, whether they had originally intended to do so or not, thus invoking Article 16. This kept the Graf Spee in port - yet still without the facility of a dry dock or spare parts to effect repairs - and allowed more time for British forces to reach the area.

At the same time, efforts were made by the British to feed false intelligence to the Germans that an overwhelming British force was being assembled, including Force H (the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal and the battlecruiser HMS Renown), when in fact only the heavy cruiser HMS Cumberland was nearby.


HMS Cumberland, one of the earlier County class cruisers, was only a little more powerful than the Exeter, with two more 8-inch guns. It was no match alone for Admiral Graf Spee, whose 11-inch guns had much longer range and fired much heavier shells. HMS Cumberland arrived at 22:00 on December 14, after steaming at full speed for 36 hours from the Falkland Islands.



HMS Cumberland, one of the earlier County class cruisers, was only a little more powerful than the Exeter, with two more 8-inch guns. It was no match alone for Admiral Graf Spee, whose 11-inch guns had much longer range and fired much heavier shells. HMS Cumberland arrived at 22:00 on December 14, after steaming at full speed for 36 hours from the Falkland Islands.

Overwhelming British forces - including His Majesty's ships Renown, Ark Royal, Shropshire, Dorsetshire and Neptune - were en route, but would not assemble until  December 19. For the time being, the total force comprised the undamaged Cumberland, and the damaged Ajax and Achilles. To reinforce the propaganda effect, these ships, which were waiting just outside the three-mile limit, were ordered to make smoke, which could be clearly seen from the Montevideo waterfront.

The Germans, however, were entirely deceived, and expected to face a far-superior force on leaving the River Plate. The Graf Spee had also used two-thirds of its 11" ammunition and only had enough left for approximately a further 20 minutes of firing, which was hardly enough to fight its way out of Montevideo, let alone get back to Germany.

On 15 December, while the Admiral Graf Spee was prevented from leaving Montevideo harbour, the ship's 36 dead were buried with full military honours in the Cty's German  military cemetery.  Many officers of the sunk ships attended the burial of those killed in the battle and  at the graveside Captain Langsdorff was alone in using the German Naval rather than Nazi salute.

Captain Langsdorff also consulted with his command in Germany and received the personal message from Adolf Hitler

"Attempt by all means to extend time in neutral waters in order to guarantee freedom of action as long as possible.  Fight your way through to Buenos Aires, using remaining ammunition. No internment at Uruguay.  Attempt effective destruction of ship if scuttled."

The Germans feared that Uruguay could be persuaded to join the Allied cause and after the Uruguayan Government turned down the German request for the ship to be allowed two weeks in harbour for repairs, German diplomats present suggested to Langsdorff that the ship's guns be used to demolish the port installations and the battleship then being sunk across the harbour exit.  However, Langsdorff did not want to harm a neutral country.

Ultimately Captain Langsdorff chose to scuttle his ship in International waters off the River Plate estuary on 17 December, to avoid unnecessary loss of life for no particular military advantage -  a decision that is said to have infuriated Adolf Hitler. 

The majority of the Graf Spee crew were interned in Argentina. Langsdorff feared that the pro-British Uruguayans might hand over his men in breach of neutrality, and upon reporting this to Berlin he was ordered to get the crew out of Uruguay.

A ruse was attempted in which the men were set adrift in the international waters of the River Plate and picked up by three Argentine flag vessels under local German ownership. The German naval attaché then argued that since the thousand or so men were "mariners from the wreck of the 'Admiral Graf Spee'" they should not be interned but returned by neutral steamer to Germany as "survivors". Argentina was not satisfied that they fitted into this category and interned them. 

Between April 1940 and the end of 1941, all but six of the officers, and about 200 technical NCOs, absconded from internment and were back in Germany where the majority served in the U-boat Arm. Argentine naval connivance was suspected but never proved.

Captain Langsdorff committed suicide on December 19 1939 in Buenos Aires. He was buried there with full military honours, and several British officers who were present attend.




HMS Exeter was later sunk by the Japanese near Indonesia on 1 March 1942 while HMS Ajax ( pictured above ) went on to fight in the Pacific and then in the Battle of Normandy before being broken up and scrapped in 1949. HMS Achilles also finished the war and, in the service of the Royal New Zealand Navy, was eventually scrapped in 1976 after decades of peacetime service.




Meanwhile, on 13 December 1939, HMS Exeter with 60 of her crew lost and in a very bad condition began the long journey to Port Stanley in the Falkland Islands, where temporary repairs were made to make her fit for the long journey back to the U.K.  In the greatest secrecy, she sailed into her home port of Plymouth on 14 February 1940. Word quickly spread and huge crowds lined every vantage point to see the ship sail in to a huge hero's welcome.

HMS Exeter was later sunk by the Japanese near Indonesia on 1 March 1942 while HMS Ajax ( pictured above )  went on to fight in the Pacific and then in the Battle of Normandy before being broken up and scrapped in 1949.  HMS Achilles also finished the war and, in the service of the Royal New Zealand Navy, was eventually scrapped in 1976 after decades of peacetime service.